

Arming International Crimes

Germany's Continuing
Arms Exports to Israel
2023–2026

ECCHR

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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past three years, Germany has continued to authorize arms exports to Israel, even as evidence of grave international crimes by Israeli forces in Gaza continued to mount. Germany is not a marginal supplier. Between 2021 and 2025, it accounted for 31 percent of Israel's major arms imports, second only to the United States.¹

As of 28 August 2026, Israel's military assault on Gaza has killed at least 73,438 Palestinians²—a figure which likely substantially understates the true casualty toll.³ This killing did not begin after the Hamas-led atrocities of October 7th,⁴ and it did not stop with the so-called ceasefire agreement of 10 October 2025. In the eleven months since, Israeli attacks on Gaza have killed at least 1,303 Palestinians and injured 4,336.⁵ In addition, attacks on health care facilities continue: in the first seven months of 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) recorded 45 attacks on health care in Gaza, over a third with “heavy weapons,” a term that includes tanks.⁶ Israeli forces retain their military presence in Gaza and currently control up to 70 percent of the enclave.⁷ In August 2026, Israeli Minister of National Security Ben Gvir said that Palestinians were “not even people,” and called for killing 30 to 40 Palestinians in Gaza each night.⁸

Despite shifting media attention, Israel's genocide against Palestinians in Gaza is ongoing.⁹ And so are German arms exports to Israel. **Between October 2023 and June 2026, Germany licensed arms exports to Israel worth approximately €1.47 billion, including war weapons for about €528.9 million.** After temporarily declining in the months surrounding the International Court of Justice's April 2024 decision in *Nicaragua v. Germany*, licensing subsequently accelerated again. Since the Court's Order of 30 April 2024 alone, Germany has authorized approximately €1.18 billion in additional arms exports to Israel.

This continuing licensing raises a fundamental legal problem. Arms export law is preventive law. Under German, European and international law, authorities are not required to wait until a particular German weapon has been traced to a particular unlawful attack. Nor is certainty about its future unlawful use required. The applicable rules require authorities to assess risk prospectively. Where there is an “overriding risk” under the Arms Trade Treaty or a “clear risk” under the EU Common Position that exported arms might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, authorization must be refused. The Genocide Convention imposes an additional duty of prevention once a State is aware, or should be aware, of a serious risk of genocide. Measured against these standards, the relevant risk thresholds were crossed long ago. While the German

government briefly restricted new licenses in August 2025,¹⁰ the government never halted—or banned—the export of arms to Israel. Since October 2023, United Nations bodies, international courts and human rights organizations have documented extensive patterns of unlawful attacks,

¹ SIPRI, *Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025* (March 2026), p. 11; see also SIPRI, *Global arms flows jump nearly 10 per cent as European demand soars* (2026).

² OCHA, *Reported impact snapshot: Gaza Strip* (31 August 2026).

³ A study by the Max Planck Institute published in 2025 estimated that 78,318 Palestinians were killed in Gaza between 7 October 2023 and 31 December 2024 alone, and that casualties likely exceeded 100,000 by 6 October 2025; see Max Planck Society, *Gaza study reveals unprecedented losses of life and life expectancy* (2025). According to a study published in The Lancet Global Health, Israel's attacks caused an “estimated 75 200 violent deaths (...) between Oct 7, 2023, and Jan 5, 2025, representing approximately 3.4 % of the Gaza Strip's pre-conflict population” (emphasis added), of which 42,200 were women, children and older people; see *Violent and non-violent death tolls for the Gaza conflict: new primary evidence from a population-representative field survey* The Lancet Global Health (2025).

⁴ See below, **Section IV**. United Nations resolutions have repeatedly called for a stop to arms exports to Israel, including as early as 1975; see, e.g., UN GA Res. 3414 (XXX), para. 3; UN GA, Res. 31/61, para. 5; UN GA Res. 33/71 A (1978), para. 2(a) (“states are requested to ‘refrain from any supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment or vehicles, or spare parts therefor, to Israel, without any exception’”); UN GA Res. ES-9/1, para. 12(a); UN HRC Res. ES-10/24; UN GA Res. 58/2, para. 14.

⁵ OCHA, *Humanitarian situation report* (28 August 2026).

⁶ WHO EMRO, *Attacks on health care in the Gaza Strip* (8 August 2026). Of these, 14 attacks were conducted with “heavy weapons.”

⁷ NPR, *9 months into a ceasefire, Israel now controls nearly 70 % of Gaza* (10 July 2026). When the so-called ceasefire took effect, Israeli forces controlled 53 percent of the Strip, and steadily increased the area under their control, contravening the 20-point plan for Gaza; see *IDF Expands Gaza Occupation, Displacing More Palestinians to Less Territory*, Haaretz (30 June 2026).

⁸ AP News, *Israel's Ben-Gvir advocates killing '30 to 40' people in Gaza nightly while speaking to ex-hostage*, (17 August 2026).

⁹ See also, e.g., Amnesty International, *Israel's genocide against Palestinians in Gaza continues unabated despite ceasefire* (27 November 2025); OHCHR, *Israel continues to commit genocide and other atrocity crimes by deliberately targeting Palestinian children* (23 June 2026); PCHR, *No Safe Place as Genocide Continues: Mass Killings and Intimidation Besiege Civilians Across the Gaza Strip* (19 August 2026).

¹⁰ Amnesty International called the German government's resumption of unrestricted licensing “reckless, unlawful” and warned that it “sends entirely the wrong message to Israel: that it can continue committing genocide, war crimes, and apartheid against Palestinians and unlawfully occupy the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and Gaza without fear of consequence,” and that “Governments that continue to supply arms to Israel contravene their international legal obligations”; see Amnesty International, *Germany: Arms transfers to Israel reckless, unlawful and risks complicity in Israel's international crimes* (November 2025).

mass displacement, starvation, destruction of civilian infrastructure and other serious violations in Gaza. Despite UN experts calling for a halt to all arms exports to Israel since February 2024,¹¹ despite multiple legal challenges to such exports, supported by ECCHR, and despite countless reports of Israel's war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide by the United Nations and human rights organizations,¹² German arms exports to Israel persist, and—as media attention has waned and the German Federal Constitutional Court decision of 3 February 2026 failed to yield substantial legal review of Germany's licensing regime—have risen sharply in recent months.

Germany's licensing practice is particularly difficult to reconcile with the position it advanced before the ICJ itself. In April 2024, Germany defended its arms exports by emphasizing the preventive safeguards built into its export-control regime, the case-by-case assessment of applications, the possibility of refusing or revoking licenses, the sharp decline in authorization volumes and the limited number of licenses for weapons of war.

The subsequent record undermines the factual and legal premises on which that defense rested. Licensing did not remain at the reduced levels presented to the Court. It increased substantially, even as evidence of serious international crimes accumulated. Germany therefore faces a contradiction of its own making: it cannot rely before the ICJ on a preventive, risk-based export-control system, while administering that system as though exports remain permissible.

This briefing documents that contradiction. After presenting its key findings (Section II), it explains the preventive legal framework governing arms exports and the applicable risk thresholds (Section III), gives an overview of Israel's violations of international humanitarian law, which indicate that the legal thresholds for rejecting export licenses have long been met (Section IV), before continuing with a data-driven analysis of German arms exports to Israel since October 2023 (Section V). It also demonstrates how the German government fails to meet its transparency obligations on arms exports (Section VI) and provides an overview of the judicial challenges brought against such exports (Section VII).

II. KEY FINDINGS

Between October 2023 and 31 May 2026, the German government licensed arms exports to Israel worth €1,468,964.329, while evidence of Israel's war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide continued to accumulate. Licensing continued amid three provisional measures orders by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Genocide determinations by United Nations bodies and leading human rights organizations, ICC arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Germany's own brief and partial restrictions in 2025.

The findings of this briefing reveal not merely a continuing flow of arms, but a fundamental failure to apply the preventive logic of the law governing those transfers:

- **Germany is failing to apply the standards it invoked in its own defense before the ICJ.** In April 2024, Germany defended its export practice in *Nicaragua v. Germany* by pointing to strict case-by-case risk assessments, the possibility of refusing or revoking licenses, declining authorization volumes and the small number of licenses for weapons of war. The ICJ's decision not to impose provisional measures was expressly based on the circumstances existing "at present." Since that Order, however, Germany has authorized approximately €1.18 billion in additional arms exports to Israel. Germany cannot invoke a preventive export-control system before the Court while administering it as though exports remain permissible until unlawful use has been conclusively proven.
- **€730.8 million in two months—almost four times the whole of 2025 in a single quarter.** In the second quarter of 2026 alone, Germany authorized arms exports worth close to €800 million, approximately four times the total of 2025. While it attributes over 67 percent of that value to one major maritime project, as well as 21 percent for a German Israeli cooperation "for the benefit of the German military," this still leaves about €88.29 million for "smaller" individual licenses.¹³
- **Export licenses in the first half of 2026 already surpass the total value per year in the last 25 years.** The total of €799,340,076 from January to June 2026 also surpasses the sum of 2023, 2024 and 2025.

¹¹ OHCHR, *Arms exports to Israel must stop immediately, say UN experts* (February 2024).

¹² See in more detail below, Section IV.

¹³ Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/6244, p.24; BT-Drs. 21/7457, p.2.

- **War weapons returned in 2026.** In the second quarter of 2026, the German government authorized the export of war weapons to Israel for €508,750,000—the first such licenses since February 2024. A submarine appears to account for about €492.96 million, this leaves about **€15.79 Million for other weapons of war, including projectiles and propellant charges for anti-tank weapons and artillery.** The arms may be part of a German Israeli cooperation.¹⁴ At the ICJ, Germany argued that “*the risks associated with the export of war weapons are naturally much higher;*” and defended itself by pointing to the high proportion of “other armed goods” it had licensed.¹⁵
- **Tank and armored-vehicle parts dominated licensing in the first half of 2025** Nearly three-fifths of the €86.8 million licensed in the first six months of 2025 concerned tank and armored vehicle parts—equipment capable of maintaining the systems used in Israel’s ground operations in Gaza. **Over the year 2025, Germany licensed tank and armored vehicle parts for over €111 million**¹⁶
- **Germany’s “protective equipment” defense is contradicted by its own data.** Germany repeatedly invoked protective and training equipment as exemplary when describing its military exports to Israel, including before the ICJ. Yet, in 2024, protective equipment accounted only for €106,000 of the €163.8 million licensed—a mere 0.065 percent. **No specialized military training equipment was licensed.**¹⁷
- **Even Germany’s temporary “restrictions” did not stop arms licensing.** Between 8 August and 23 November 2025, the only period in which official restrictions applied, Germany authorized **€10.4 million** in exports across ten categories, among them tank parts. Once restrictions were lifted, Germany issued another 65 licenses worth €53.9 million in only 18 days.¹⁸
- **Israel has continuously imported arms from Germany since October 2023, and six months of 2026 almost match a full year of tank-part imports.** Israeli customs data records continuing imports from Germany and shows that German tank and armored-vehicle imports during the first six months of 2026 already reached approximately 96 percent of the value recorded for the whole of 2025.¹⁹ These records exclude imports through military ports and airbases.
- **Transparency has fallen below the constitutional floor.** In 2014, the German Federal Constitutional Court held that the government must generally disclose information, including the type and number of weapons, recipient country, companies involved and total value of each authorized transaction.²⁰ A summary description by export list category is insufficient for parliamentary oversight. Current government responses increasingly provide only license numbers and broad export-list categories—precisely the kind of aggregated information that prevents meaningful parliamentary scrutiny.

Between 2021 and 2025, Germany supplied **31 percent** of Israel’s arms imports, second only to the United States at 68 percent. Together the two states accounted for **99 percent** of Israeli arms imports.²¹ While licensing fluctuated, it never stopped.

[→ FIG. 1 | P. 5]

¹⁴ Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/7457, pp. 2–3. **Disclaimer:** the latter two figures are based on a calculation.

¹⁵ ICJ, *Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory* (Nicaragua v. Germany), Provisional Measures, oral pleadings of Germany, *verbatim record* (9 April 2024), para. 19.

¹⁶ Bundesregierung, *Bericht über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im ersten Halbjahr 2025* BMW, BT-Drs. 21/3362 (10 December 2025), pp. 13, 17.

¹⁷ European Union, *Twenty-Seventh Annual Report* Doc. C/2026/2832 (15 June 2026), pp. 160, 162.


¹⁸ Bundestag, BT-Drs 21/5249, p. 71, and BT-Drs. 21/3373, p. 36.

¹⁹ Israeli customs import records, code 8710.

²⁰ BVerfG, *Judgment of 21 October 2014*, 2 BvE 5/11, 2 BvE 5/11.

²¹ SIPRI, *Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025* (March 2026), p. 11.

FIGURE 1.
DISAGGREGATED VALUES LICENSED BY GERMANY
BETWEEN OCTOBER 2023 AND MAY 2026, AS WELL
AS CUMULATIVE TOTAL OVER THE SAME PERIOD.



- Estimate from ICJ pleadings
 - Licensed in quarter
 - German-Israeli military cooperation — 21% of QII 2026
 - Single maritime project — 67% of QII 2026
 - Cumulative total (right axis)
- * Figures from Oct overlap five days, numbers may therefore be lower.
Approximately €2.3 m of 2024 was never broken out at all.

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: ARMS EXPORTS LAW AS RISK-PREVENTION LAW

International, European and German arms export law is not designed to establish responsibility after exported weapons have been used to commit violations. Its central function is to **stop transfers before a legally relevant risk materializes**.²² Accordingly, the applicable standards do not require proof that a specific German weapon has already been used in a particular unlawful attack. Nor do they require certainty as to the recipient's future conduct. They require authorities to assess prospectively whether there is a sufficient risk of prohibited future use and, **once the applicable risk threshold is met, to refuse authorization**.

This preventive structure is clearest in Articles 6 and 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Under Article 6(3) ATT, a transfer is prohibited where the exporting State has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or other war crimes. Even where that stricter prohibition is considered not to apply, Article 7 ATT establishes an independent and lower risk threshold. Germany must assess whether the arms or items “could be used to commit or facilitate” serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law. If, after considering possible mitigation measures, an “**overriding risk**” remains, the export authorization must be denied (Article 7(3) ATT). If new relevant information becomes available after authorization, the exporting State is encouraged to reassess that authorization (Article 7(7) ATT).

The same preventive logic governs EU law. Under Article 2 of EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, Germany **must deny** an export license where there is a “**clear risk**” that the military technology or equipment “**might be used**” in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law. The wording is deliberately prospective. A “clear risk” that an item “might be used” is not equivalent to proof that it will be used unlawfully. **The assessment must take account, in particular, of the recipient's past and present record of compliance with international humanitarian law.** A persistent pattern of violations is therefore not merely contextual information: it is directly relevant to the mandatory licensing criterion and thus demands serious consideration.²³

The **Genocide Convention** establishes an additional and independent constraint on arms transfers. Although it does not contain an express export-control provision, its Article I requires every contracting State “to prevent and to punish” genocide. This obligation is not confined to refraining from committing genocidal acts. It imposes a positive duty

on States to **prevent genocide from occurring or continuing**. In its 2007 judgment in *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro*, the ICJ clarified that the duty to prevent arises “*at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed*.”²⁴ The duty to prevent genocide is therefore not reliant on a determination of genocide. **Legally, only knowledge of a serious risk of genocide must be present.**

Once this knowledge threshold is met, continued military support cannot be treated as legally neutral. A State cannot plausibly claim to be exercising the due diligence required by Article I of the Genocide Convention while supplying equipment that strengthens the military capacity through which the feared acts may be carried out. Accordingly, Article I requires Germany to refrain from arms transfers where they may contribute to a serious risk of genocide, facilitate acts falling within Article II of the Convention, or undermine measures reasonably available to Germany to prevent those acts. At the very least, it requires the immediate suspension and rigorous reassessment of all relevant authorizations. Where the serious risk cannot be reliably excluded or effectively mitigated, continued export is incompatible with the duty to prevent.

In addition, Common Article 1 of the **Geneva Conventions** of 1949 requires Germany not only to respect but also to “ensure respect” for international humanitarian law. At a minimum, this entails a negative obligation not to transfer arms where there is an evident risk that it will contribute to violations.

Domestic law must be interpreted and applied consistently with these international and European obligations. While German arms-export law distinguishes between (1) so-called “weapons of war” (*Kriegswaffen*) and (2) “other military equipment” (*sonstige Rüstungsgüter*), and each category has its own legal basis, licensing procedure and responsible authority, international law does not. For this reason, both categories of items are **equally subject to the “overriding” and “clear” risk assessments** set out in the ATT and the EU Common Position.

²² Stuart Casey-Maslen et al., *The Arms Trade Treaty: A Commentary*, OUP 2016, commentary on Arts. 6–7.

²³ Council of the European Union, *User's Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP*, paras. 2.1–2.3 und 2.13; updated by Doc. 6881/25 (14 April 2025).

²⁴ ICJ, *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro*, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007 (I), p. 222, para. 431.

The licensing of weapons of war is primarily governed by the War Weapons Control Act (*Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz*),²⁵ which is complemented by the Foreign Trade Act (*Außenwirtschaftsgesetz*—AWG). Decisions on licenses are made by the Federal government,²⁶ the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA), and in certain particularly sensitive cases, the National Security Council.²⁷ Under section 6(3) No.2 of the German War Weapons Control Act, a license must be refused where there is **reason to assume** that granting the license would violate Germany's obligations under international law. Such obligations include the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT),²⁸ the EU Common Position on Arms Exports,²⁹ the Genocide Convention,³⁰ and the Geneva Conventions.³¹

The Foreign Trade and Payments Act and Ordinance³² provides the domestic authorization framework for “other military equipment”. While the law offers administrative discretion, the Federal Government's “Political Principles”³³ require particular restraint and make respect for human rights and international humanitarian law central to the licensing decision. This discretion is also legally constrained by the ATT, the EU Common Position, Germany's obligations under the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions, and the constitutional commitment to international law.

The German government has argued in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that this system allows for “robust” arms export control.³⁴ Additionally, it stated that “other military equipment” refers to goods “*typically of a subordinate or defensive nature*,”³⁵ and requires less scrutiny, as “*the risks associated with the export of war weapons are naturally much higher*.”³⁶ This characterization is misleading: the second category also comprises parts of weapons of war, such as parts of battle tanks. It creates an artificial distinction that has no grounding in international law, which does not distinguish between arms and the parts thereof.

²⁵ *Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz* (Ausführungsgesetz zu Artikel 26 Abs. 2 des Grundgesetzes), *consolidated text* (in German).

²⁶ Sect. 11(1) War Weapons Control Act.

²⁷ „Nationaler Sicherheitsrat“, formerly „Bundessicherheitsrat“.

²⁸ United Nations, *Arms Trade Treaty* (2013).

²⁹ Council of the European Union, *Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, consolidated version* (15 April 2025).

³⁰ *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 United Nations Treaty Series 277.

³¹ *Esp. Fourth Geneva Convention* (Civilians): 75 UNTS 287 (1949).

³² *Außenwirtschaftsgesetz* (AWG), *English translation*.

³³ BMW, *Politische Grundsätze der Bundesregierung für den Export von Kriegswaffen und sonstigen Rüstungsgütern* (2019).

³⁴ ICJ, *Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory* (Nicaragua v. Germany), Provisional Measures, oral pleadings of Germany, *verbatim record* (9 April 2024), para. 14 ff.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 14.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 19.

IV. ISRAEL'S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CROSSED THE RISK THRESHOLD

Measured against any of the outlined standards, the risk threshold for refusing further exports to Israel was reached long ago. Reports by human rights organizations and the United Nations establish Israel's long-lasting record of non-compliance with international law. Therefore, an "overriding" or "clear" risk of such violations already existed before October 2023,³⁷ with more recent reports documenting how that risk intensified in the months following the Hamas-led atrocities of October 7th. Within days of the start of the military offensive on Gaza, UN bodies³⁸ and NGOs³⁹ reported violations of international law by Israeli forces. In January 2024, the ICJ ordered its first provisional measures, finding that there was a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed under the Genocide Convention.⁴⁰ The Court consequently ordered Israel, *inter alia*, to prevent acts within Article II of the Genocide Convention and to enable urgently needed humanitarian assistance.⁴¹ The ICJ ordered further immediate measures in March⁴² and May 2024.⁴³

The UN⁴⁴ and numerous human rights organizations,⁴⁵ including Amnesty International⁴⁶ and ECCHR,⁴⁷ have since determined that Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza.

While a judicial determination of an international court on genocide is still outstanding, it is not necessary to trigger the arms exports law thresholds. A judicial finding of a real and imminent risk to rights protected by the Genocide Convention necessarily exceeds the much lower threshold of a clear or overriding risk that arms might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law.⁴⁸ It is legally incoherent to accept that there was a real and imminent risk of irreparable harm under the Genocide Convention while maintaining that there was no sufficiently clear risk for the purposes of Article 7 ATT or Criterion Two of the EU Common Position.

- 37 See, e.g., UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Report on the implementation of Human Rights Council resolutions S-9/1 and S-12/1* UN Doc. A/HRC/22/35/Add.1 (6 March 2013), pp. 5 f.; UN HRC, *Report of the detailed findings of the independent commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-21/1* UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.4 (24 June 2015), paras. 219–221, 223, 227 ff., 293, 337, 365, 370, 388, 420 ff.; PCHR, *In New War Crime, Israeli Forces Kill 2 Palestinian Civilians and Wound 23 Others, Including 2 Children, While Targeting Densely Populated Area in Gaza*; Amnesty International, *Six Months On: Gaza's Great March of Return* (October 2018); Human Rights Watch, *Israel: Apparent War Crimes in Gaza* (13 June 2018); Amnesty International, *Israel/OPT: Six Palestinians killed within 24 hours, some deaths may involve war crimes* (September 2018); Amnesty International, *Israel/OPT: Pattern of Israeli attacks on residential homes in Gaza must be investigated as war crimes* (May 2021); Amnesty International, *"They Were Just Kids": Evidence of War Crimes During Israel's August 2022 Gaza Offensive* (October 2022); UN, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel* UN Doc. A/78/198, paras. 11 ff., 25 f.; B'Tselem, *A regime of Jewish supremacy from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea: This is apartheid* (January 2021); Human Rights Watch, *A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution* (27 April 2021); Amnesty International, *Israel's system of apartheid* (February 2022); UN HRC, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel* UN Doc. A/HRC/50/21 (9 May 2022).
- 38 UN Secretary-General, *"It's Time to End This Vicious Circle" of Bloodshed, Hatred with Negotiated Peace Fulfilling Aspirations of Palestinians*, Israelis UN Doc. SG/SM/21984 (9 October 2023).
- 39 See PCHR, *Gaza under Attack: Civilian Objects Targeted and Destruction and Casualties Inflicted by Israeli Retaliatory Strikes* (8 October 2023); Human Rights Watch, *Israel/Palestine: Devastating Civilian Toll as Parties Flout Legal Obligations* (9 October 2023); International Commission of Jurists, *Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territory: immediately end attacks on civilians* (10 October 2023); Amnesty International, *Israel/Gaza: Zivilbevölkerung zahlt den Preis für den Angriff der Hamas und die militärische Reaktion Israels* (10 October 2023).
- 40 ICJ, *South Africa v. Israel*, Order of 26 January 2024, para. 74 f.
- 41 Ibid., para. 86.
- 42 ICJ, *South Africa v. Israel*, Order of 28 March 2024.
- 43 ICJ, *South Africa v. Israel*, Order of 24 May 2024.
- 44 UN HRC, Legal analysis of the conduct of Israel in Gaza pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (16 September 2025); UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the OPT, *Anatomy of a Genocide* (1 July 2024); UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, *Starvation and the Right to Food, with an Emphasis on the Palestinian People's Food Sovereignty*, (17 July 2024), para. 43.
- 45 Human Rights Watch, *Israel's Crime of Extermination, Acts of Genocide in Gaza* (19 December 2024); Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention and Human Security, *Statement on Why We Call the Israeli Attack on Gaza Genocide and Four Facts About Israel's Genocide*; Physicians for Human Rights Israel, *Genocide in Gaza*; B'Tselem, *Our Genocide* (July 2025).
- 46 Amnesty International, *Amnesty International concludes Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza* (December 2024).
- 47 ECCHR, *Gaza and the matter of genocide* (10 December 2024).
- 48 Irene Pietropaoli, *Obligations of Third States and Corporations to Prevent and Punish Genocide in Gaza*, SOMO, (June 2024), p. 22–28.

Among other incidents, investigations by the UN and NGOs have documented the use of Israeli tanks in numerous violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza. For example, Human Rights Watch documented tanks **shooting at aid seekers** and hospitals, and how an Israeli tank blockaded Al-Shifa Hospital and **fired on civilians** attempting to evacuate it in November 2023. **Forensic Architecture** reconstructed the January 2024 killing of six-year-old Hind Rajab and her family, in which a tank-mounted gun hit their vehicle 335 times. Israeli forces subsequently fired a 120mm tank round on the deconflicted ambulance sent to rescue her, killing both paramedics. Tanks were also used to attack **MSF housing** in February 2024, as well **an ICRC building** and a **UN guesthouse** in early 2025, killing further humanitarian workers. Investigations also found that Israeli forces used tanks **to physically crush Palestinians**.

Tanks also played a pivotal role in prior Israeli offenses on Gaza. For example, tank fire at houses **killed 19 Palestinians, including children**, in 2006. In 2008, tank shelling **killed Palestinian civilians** in Gaza. During the 2014 hostilities, the UN documented **16,507 artillery and tank projectiles** fired in Gaza, with Human Rights Watch research indicating that multiple **tanks attacks on hospitals** in 2014 were intentional or reckless, and therefore war crimes.

German authorities repeatedly claim to issue export licenses on a case-by-case basis, for which, according to the government's "political principles," they consider UN and NGO reports, among other information.⁴⁹ Given the extent of findings by internationally recognized bodies—only a selection of which could be cited above—the German government cannot credibly claim to have been unaware of these violations, or of the risk they have given rise to. The body of evidence is overwhelming. German authorities must assess the chances of whether the authorized arms could or might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations. Once the available information reveals a pattern of serious violations and a continuing danger that arms may facilitate their commission as is the case here, the authority cannot lawfully authorize exports. In this regard, it is irrelevant whether the precise future use of a component remains uncertain. That uncertainty is the object of the statutory risk assessment, not a basis for avoiding it.⁵⁰

Accordingly, Germany should have suspended new authorizations and reassessed, suspended or revoked existing authorizations for all arms exports capable of contributing to Israel's military operations. This applies not only to complete weapons systems and ammunition, but also to engines, spare parts and other components. An item need not itself deliver the lethal force: Article 7(3) ATT expressly

covers facilitation. Components that maintain, repair or enable military systems may facilitate violations just as directly as complete weapons.

According to ECCHR's legal assessment, authorizations of arms exports to Israel despite the presence of an overriding, clear risk of IHL violations therefore violated, and continue to violate, domestic and international legal obligations. Germany's extensive arms export licensing nevertheless not only persisted throughout Israel's military assaults, throughout the starvation, the displacement and disproportionate attacks that have marked the past three years. But its arms licensing practice has recently intensified.

⁴⁹ BMW, *Politische Grundsätze der Bundesregierung für den Export von Kriegswaffen und sonstigen Rüstungsgütern* (2019).

⁵⁰ EU User's Guide, Doc. 10858/15, para. 2.13.

V. GERMAN ARMS EXPORTS TO ISRAEL IN NUMBERS

While Israel's military-industrial complex includes a substantial domestic arms industry, imported arms have been vital to its military assault on Gaza, including operations in which serious violations of international humanitarian law have been documented. A near-constant supply from the United States and Germany, which together account for roughly 99 percent of major Israeli weapons imports,⁵¹ has armed Israeli forces and enhanced their capacity to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

METHODOLOGY

This report is based on research accompanying ECCHR-supported arms export litigation against the German government and covers the period between October 2023 and June 2026. As other organizations such as Forensis⁵² and Shadow World Investigations⁵³ have extensively analyzed German arms exports to Israel in 2023 and 2024, this report largely focuses on data that has become available since the publication of their findings.

The report builds on publicly available information, particularly data published by the German government, including its quarterly, bi-annual and annual arms export reports and its answers to parliamentary questions (*"Kleine Anfragen"*). It further analyzes data published by the German Federal Statistical Office, the European Union, which reports disaggregated accounts of member states' arms exports in its Annual Reports,⁵⁴ as well as transfer data by databases of the United Nations and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Goods that require an export license pursuant to German law are classified according to their Export List Number, the *"Ausfuhrlistennummer"* ("AL-Number").⁵⁵ These classifications generally include parts of these goods.⁵⁶ Goods considered war weapons are additionally listed in the War Weapons List (*"Kriegswaffenliste"*, "KWL").⁵⁷

[→ TABLE. 1 | P. 11]

Similarly to the AL-Numbers, the EU Military list ("ML") uses 22 categories, spanning from ML1 to ML22. In substance, the categories overlap with the AL-Numbers outlined above.⁵⁸ Small divergences, e.g. regarding vehicle ballistic-protection thresholds, however, do exist.

War weapons listed in the KWL generally cover only the complete weapon.⁵⁹ In contrast, a battle tank engine or transmission, for example, would be classified as "other military equipment" under AL-Number A0006.

[→ TABLE. 2 | P. 11]

Germany does not publish disaggregated information on the arms it exports.⁶⁰ The only available figures refer to the value of the licenses granted, which can deviate from the market value of the goods. The data presented below is disaggregated where possible; however, the government's lack of transparency (see Section V) permits differentiation only to a limited extent.

As the German government does not publish broken down data on actual exports, this briefing additionally relies on the import database of the Israeli tax authorities, which has historically been available at data.gov.il.⁶¹ The database offers only a partial view of imports into Israel: it appears to exclude shipments to military ports and airbases such as Nevatim Airbase,⁶² does not account for complex supply chains, and therefore cannot capture the full scope of German arms exports to Israel. At the time of publication, the website of the database was unavailable, for reasons that are unclear. CSV-format downloads from data.gov.il can be made available on request.

51 SIPRI, *Global arms flows jump nearly 10 per cent as European demand soars* (2026).

52 A detailed report by the research organization Forensis from April 2024 looks at data until mid-March 2024, see Forensis, *German Arms Exports to Israel 2003–2023* (April 2024).

53 Shadow World Investigations, *Germany supplied fighting vehicle parts and other arms to Israel throughout 2024*. The briefing analyzes Israeli import data up to 17 December 2024.

54 Owing to delays in the publication of these annual reports, data is available only until 2024.

55 Außenwirtschaftsverordnung, *Anlage 1 (Ausfuhrliste)*.

56 Only A0008, A0016, A0021 and A0022 do not explicitly mention parts thereof (*"Bestandteile"*).

57 Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz, *Anlage (Kriegswaffenliste)*.

58 Council of the European Union, *Common Military List of the European Union* Doc. ST 5414/2025 (2025).

59 An exception are certain highly specialized „essential“ components, see e.g., KWL-Numbers 56–60.

60 It does publish yearly, however not disaggregated data of exports on Statistisches Bundesamt, Genesis-Online, *Exports and imports: Germany*.

61 Israel Tax Authority, *Customs import statistics data*.

62 Declassified UK, *F-35 components sent to Israel from Royal Air Force base*.

TABLE 1.

EXPORT LIST NUMBER (“AUSFUHRLISTENNUMMER” (“AL-NUMBER”) ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN TRADE REGULATION (AWV) APPENDIX 1, APPENDIX AL

AL-NR.	DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLES
0001	Small caliber arms	Rifles, pistols, machine guns
0002	Large caliber weapons and launchers	Artillery, mortars, anti-tank weapons
0003	Ammunition and fuse-setting devices	Ammunition, fuses, propellant charges
0004	Bombs, missiles and explosives	Bombs, missiles, mines, torpedoes
0005	Fire-control and surveillance systems	Targeting, tracking, weapon-control systems
0006	Military land vehicles and components	Armored vehicles, military trucks
0007	Chemical, biological and radioactive agents	Toxic chemicals, biological agents, riot-control agents (e.g. tear gas)
0008	Energetic materials and related substances	Explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics
0009	Warships and naval equipment	Warships, submarines, naval equipment
0010	Military aircraft and components	Aircraft, helicopters, UAVs
0011	Electronic systems and spacecraft	Electronic warfare technology, military electronics, military satellites
0012	Kinetic Weapons	Kinetic interceptors, high-energy systems
0013	Protective Equipment	Armor materials such as protective shields, helmets, ballistic composites
0014	Training equipment	Military training, simulation equipment
0015	Military imaging and sensor equipment	Thermal cameras, image intensifiers
0016	Special unfinished military components	Forgings, castings, unfinished components
0017	Other military equipment	Diving equipment, fuel cells
0018	Military production and testing equipment	Manufacturing equipment, environmental testers
0019	Directed-Energy weapons	High-energy lasers, particle beams
0020	Cryogenic equipment	Cryogenic systems, superconducting equipment
0021	Military software	Simulation software, weapons-control software
0022	Military technology	Design, manufacturing, maintenance technology

TABLE 2.

SELECTION OF CLASSIFICATIONS FROM THE GERMAN ACT ON THE CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF WAR, APPENDIX (TO SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH 1) LIST OF WEAPONS OF WAR (KWL)

KWL-NR.	DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLES
18	Submarines	Dolphin submarines
24	Battle tanks	Leonard battle tanks (excl. parts thereof)
37	Low-recoil, unguided, portable anti-tank weapons	Dynamit Nobel Defence “Matador” anti-tank weapons
50	Ammunition for the weapons for barrel weapons	Ammunition for machine guns, fully or semi-automatic rifles
54	Projectiles for weapons under Nos. 49 & 52 (cannons, howitzers, mortars & anti-tank weapons)	155mm howitzer shells; anti-tank missiles
55	Propellant charges for weapons under Nos. 49 & 52	Propelling charges for artillery/mortar
57	Fuzes for weapons under Nos. 7–9, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 51–53 & 59	Impact & proximity fuzes for artillery shells (CE-certified fuzes excluded)

The survey of Israeli import data is limited to the Harmonized System (HS)⁶³ codes “8710” and “93” as defined by the World Customs Organization (WCO). Code 8710 covers “Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, motorized, whether or not fitted with weapons, and parts of such vehicles.” The Israeli customs database uses 87100000 for this category.⁶⁴

[→ TABLE.3 | P.13]

Code 93 covers “Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof,” and comprises several subcategories.

[→ TABLE.4 | P.13]

All values in new Israeli shekels (ILS) were converted to euro at the average exchange rate for the year concerned. For 2025 the average rate was ILS 1 = EUR 0.257 (EUR 1 = ILS 3.89); for 2026 it was ILS 1 = EUR 0.284 (EUR 1 = ILS 3.52).⁶⁵ Due to the limitations outlined above, particularly the far-reaching lack of transparency by the German government, the data presented below is necessarily incomplete. In some cases, only preliminary or fragmented data was available. In certain cases, findings are therefore based on calculations from available data. These findings are flagged as such.

⁶³ The “Harmonized System” is an international multipurpose nomenclature introduced by the World Customs Organization; see World Customs Organization, *What is the Harmonized System?*. Israel uses this system for its customs classifications; see Israel Tax Authority, *Customs Book*.

⁶⁴ Israel Tax Authority, *Customs Book*, item 18034.

⁶⁵ See European Central Bank, Israeli Shekel.

TABLE 3.
HARMONIZED SYSTEM (HS) CODES BY
THE WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION (WCO)

HS CODE	DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLES
8710	Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles	Battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other armored combat vehicles, as well as parts of such vehicles

TABLE 4.
HARMONIZED SYSTEM (HS) CODES BY
THE WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION (WCO)

HS CODE	DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLES ⁶⁶
9301	Military weapons	Machine guns, artillery weapons, rocket and grenade launchers
9302	Handguns	Revolvers and pistols (excl. muzzle-loaders)
9303	Sporting & flare guns	Sport and hunting rifles, shotguns, muzzle-loaders, signal pistols
9304	Other arms	Air rifles/pistols, spring guns, truncheons, batons
9305	Parts & accessories of 9301 -9304	Barrels, trigger mechanisms, silencers, stocks, mounts
9306	Bombs & ammunitions and parts thereof	Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles, cartridges and other ammunition, bullets, cartridges, shells
9307	Bladed side arms	Swords, cutlasses, bayonets, lances, daggers

⁶⁶ Examples and descriptions based on Amnesty International, *Made in India: The Supply of Weapons and Ammunition to Israel*, (30 July 2026), pp. 7 f.; see also European Commission, *Section XIX ARMS AND AMMUNITION; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF CHAPTER 93*.

OVERVIEW OF GERMAN ARMS EXPORTS

For many years, Germany has consistently ranked among the largest suppliers of arms to Israel. Still, its exports have risen sharply since October 2023. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), **Germany supplied 31 percent of the arms Israel imported between 2021 and 2025.**⁶⁷

[→ FIG. 2 | P. 15]

This places Germany second only to the United States. The two countries together accounted for about 99 percent of Israeli arms imports over those five years.⁶⁸

Between October 2023 and 30 June 2026, Germany licensed a total of € 1,468,964,329⁶⁹ in arms exports to Israel, including for the export of war weapons for € 528,915,647.⁷⁰ While German arms exports accounted for about a third of Israeli arms imports for years, the value of arms exports licensed by the German government increased ten-fold between 2022 and 2023. In total, Germany approved 308 individual licenses worth €326,505,156 for export to Israel in 2023.⁷¹ That figure includes four licenses for so-called “war weapons,” among them 3,000 portable “Matador” anti-tank weapons made by the German manufacturer Dynamit Nobel Defence, as well as 500,000 rounds of ammunition.⁷² Data from the UNROCA database indicates that the 3,000 anti-tank weapons were exported to Israel in 2023,⁷³ which is consistent with statements of the government in court proceedings supported by ECCHR. The government also exported six items classified as “2. Rifles and carbines” to Israel as “samples” that year.⁷⁴ According to SIPRI, Israel further imported 50 Rolls-Royce MTU MT883Ka (1,500 hp) diesel engines for Merkava IV and V tanks and Namer armored personnel carriers in 2023, assembled in the United States from components produced in Germany.⁷⁵

EXPORTS IN 2024

In spring of 2024, the ICJ was set to rule on immediate measures requested by Nicaragua, among them an immediate suspension of military assistance to Israel.⁷⁶ Licensing volumes were low in the months surrounding the ICJ decision, with as little as €187 authorized in May 2024.⁷⁷

In its first oral hearings of the ICJ’s *Nicaragua v. Germany* proceedings in April 2024, Germany relied on two central propositions: licensing had fallen sharply since October 2023, and the overwhelming majority of authorizations concerned “other military equipment.” Regarding the latter, Germany argued that the exports it authorized were “*inter alia*, for lenses for daylight observation binoculars, bonding devices for hydrogen storage on submarines and infrared protection systems for defense against guided missiles.”⁷⁸ In contrast, it did not

mention licensing the export of tank parts. The data now available allows both propositions to be placed in perspective.⁷⁹

[→ FIG. 3 | P. 15]

On 30 April 2024, the ICJ declined to order provisional measures in *Nicaragua v. Germany*. The Court noted the “significant decrease” in arms exports since November 2023, as presented by Germany, and the low volume of licenses for war weapons.⁸⁰ The Court’s assessment was expressly temporal.⁸¹ **What followed matters: since the Court’s order of 30 April 2024, Germany has authorized approximately €1.18 billion⁸² in additional arms exports to Israel.**

The low volumes in the first half of 2024 may be attributable to unilateral measures taken by the German Foreign Office, which used “delaying tactics” to reduce arms exports to Israel starting in early 2024, according to investigative reporting by the newspaper *Die Zeit*.⁸³ In addition, media reported that a request for a written guarantee of IHL compliance by Israel delayed licensing proceedings.⁸⁴

67 SIPRI, *Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025* (March 2026), p. 11; see also SIPRI, *Global arms flows jump nearly 10 per cent as European demand soars* (2026).

68 SIPRI, *Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025* (March 2026), p. 11; Zain Hussain and Pieter Wezeman, *The role of imported arms in the Iran war: Q&A SIPRI* (2026).

69 Disclaimer: This figure is based on a calculation from German government reports and answers to parliamentary questions. It is based on BMW, *Rüstungsexportpolitik der Bundesregierung im 1. Halbjahr 2026* (15 July 2026) and Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/3774, p. 4.

70 Disclaimer: This figure is based on a calculation from Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/3774, p. 5; BMW, *Rüstungsexportbericht 2023*, p. 32; BT-Drs. 20/11838, pp. 7–8, as well as BT-Drs. 21/7457, p. 3.

71 Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 20/14515, pp. 8, 102.

72 The figure also includes 44 propelling charges for heavy weapons or ammunition systems (KWL No. 55) and 239 fuses for military ordinance.

73 UNROCA, *Germany, report for 2023*. The arms are classified as “4. Recoilless rifles.”

74 Ibid.

75 SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database, Transfer Register*. The deliveries derive from an order placed in 2000 comprising 1,370 engines; see *ibid*.

76 ICJ, *Nicaragua v. Germany*, Application instituting proceedings and request for the indication of provisional measures (1 March 2024), para. 101.

77 Bundestag, BT-Drs. 20/11712, p. 7.

78 ICJ, *Nicaragua v. Germany*, *verbatim record CR 2024/19* (9 April 2024), p. 20, para. 25.

79 Ibid., p. 12, para. 24 and p. 20, para. 23.

80 ICJ, *Nicaragua v. Germany*, *Order of 30 April 2024*, para. 18.

81 Ibid., para. 20.

82 Disclaimer: This figure is based on a calculation, with some of the numbers provided by the German government being provisional values.

83 *Die Zeit*, *Welche Verantwortung trägt Deutschland?* (13. August 2025).

84 Tagesspiegel, *Schriftliche Garantien von Jerusalem gefordert?: Habeck und Baerbock sollen Waffenexporte an Israel blockiert haben* (14. October 2024).

FIGURE 2.
SHARES OF ISRAELI ARMS IMPORTS
BY COUNTRY BETWEEN 2021-25
(SOURCE: SIPRI)





FIGURE 3.
FIGURES PRESENTED BY GERMANY IN THE ORAL
PROCEEDINGS OF NICARAGUA V. GERMANY AT THE
ICJ ON 9 APRIL 2024⁸⁵



85 UN Web TV, *Nicaragua v. Germany*, public hearing, at 37:32.

Slowing licensing processes attracted scrutiny by the CDU and FDP political parties⁸⁶—and appear to have rebooted arms exports to “full speed”: in the two months between **22 August and 23 October 2024**, and thus most likely before Israel issued its “guarantee,”⁸⁷ authorities approved licenses worth at least **€93.13 million**,⁸⁸ the highest volumes that year.

[→ FIG. 4 | P. 17]

In October 2024, then-chancellor Olaf Scholz announced *“We have delivered weapons, and we will deliver weapons.”*⁸⁹ Data published by the European Union in its 27th Annual Report on arms exports⁹⁰ shows that the licenses worth **€163,767,512** granted in 2024 did not mainly consist of defensive or training equipment. They included

- 31 licenses worth **€48,020,282** classified as ML 6 (“Ground vehicles and components,” such as tanks and tank parts),
- 6 licenses worth **€37,354,656** classified as ML 3 (“Ammunition and fuse-setting devices,” and specially designed components), and
- 13 licenses worth **€13,223,137** classified as ML 4 (“Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other explosive devices,” as well as related equipment and components).⁹¹

[→ FIG. 5 | P. 18]

In contrast, armored and protective equipment (ML13) accounted for only **€106,000**, or some 0.065 percent of the year’s total of **€163.8 million**. The German government licensed no specialized military training equipment (ML14) in 2024.⁹² The government has nonetheless repeatedly invoked protective and training equipment as representative of “other military equipment,” and of its arms exports to Israel more generally.⁹³

Across all EU member states, licenses in the “Ground vehicles and components” category (ML6) totaled **€80,295,607**.⁹⁴ German licenses in this category accounted for 59.8 percent of the European total in 2024.

In the entire European Union, no applications for the export of goods in the “ML6” category were refused⁹⁵—despite mounting evidence of a “clear risk,” as per Criterion 2 of the EU Common Position. This is particularly the case for goods such as tank parts, which enabled Israeli forces to sustain their ground offensive in Gaza. Nevertheless, no refusal recorded in 2024 invoked Criterion 2, which obliges member states to reject applications where a clear risk to respect for human rights and international humanitarian law exists.⁹⁶ EU member states did refuse a small number of licenses under Criteria 3(1), 4(1), 4(2), 7(1) and 7(2), covering the internal situation in the destination country, regional stability and diversion risks.⁹⁷ German authorities did not record any refusals.

EXPORT LICENSING IN 2025

In 2025, the German government authorized further **175 licenses** for arms exports to Israel worth approximately **€201,557,363**,⁹⁸ an increase from the previous year despite “licensing restrictions” in the third quarter.

In the first half of 2025, authorities issued **60 licenses** worth **€86,809,879**.⁹⁹ **Tank parts (A0006)** accounted for **59.9 percent** of that sum.¹⁰⁰ The government additionally authorized the export of **ammunition parts (A0003A)** worth **€702,870**.¹⁰¹ Israel is one of only three non-EU/NATO destinations on that list, alongside Qatar and Ukraine.

[→ FIG. 6 | P. 18]

⁸⁶ ZDFHeute, *Baerbock: Keine Blockade von Waffenexporten* (16. October 2024); tagesschau, *Deutschland liefert—nach Zusage Israels* (16. October 2024).

⁸⁷ See Tagesspiegel, *Schriftliche Garantien von Jerusalem gefordert?: Habeck und Baerbock sollen Waffenexporte an Israel blockiert haben* (14. October 2024), according to which Israel signed a guarantee of IHL compliance in the second week of October.

⁸⁸ Disclaimer: This figure is based on a calculation of the sum total of 2024 (later corrected from Drs. 20/13511, p. 40), BT-Drs. 20/11838, p. 8, BT-Drs. 20/11712, p. 7, 20/12859, p. 16; 20/14661, p. 8, 20/13973, p. 5, and 21/843, p. 2. As these figures are preliminary data, deviations are possible.

⁸⁹ tagesschau, *Scholz kündigt weitere Waffenexporte nach Israel an* (10. October 2024), translation by the author.

⁹⁰ European Union, *Twenty-Seventh Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP* Doc. C/2026/2832 (15 June 2026), p. 159.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 159.

⁹² Ibid., p. 160.

⁹³ ICJ, *Nicaragua v. Germany*, *oral pleadings of Germany* (9 April 2024), para. 15. The German government stated that other military equipment “includes, for example, defence equipment against chemical hazards, protective gear such as helmets or body protection plates, communication equipment, camouflage paint and components, parts and other equipment of a subordinate character,” and that the distinction from weapons of war “is an important distinction because the risks associated with the export of war weapons are naturally much higher, which is a central factor in deciding on licenses”; *ibid.*, para. 19.

⁹⁴ European Union, *Twenty-Seventh Annual Report* Doc. C/2026/2832 (15 June 2026), p. 160.

⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 158–160.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 160.

⁹⁷ Ibid.; EU, *User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP* defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment (14 April 2025).

⁹⁸ Bundestag, *Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahre 2025 (Rüstungsexportbericht 2025)*, BT-Drs. 21/7590, p. 86. This figure includes general export licenses („Allgemeine Genehmigungen“) for €947,811, *see ibid.*

⁹⁹ Bundesregierung, *Bericht über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im ersten Halbjahr 2025*

BMWE, BT-Drs. 21/3362 (10 December 2025), pp. 9, 11, 13, 17.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 13.

FIGURE 4.
OVERVIEW OF ARMS EXPORTS APPROVED
BY GERMAN AUTHORITIES ACROSS 2024




FIGURE 5.
BREAKDOWN OF EU DATA ON GERMAN
ARMS LICENSES TO ISRAEL IN 2024,
CLASSIFIED BY ML-GROUP





FIGURE 6.
ARMS LICENSES IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2025 BY CLASSIFICATION.
SOURCE: BUNDESREGIERUNG, BERICHT ÜBER IHRE EXPORTPOLITIK FÜR
KONVENTIONELLE RÜSTUNGSGÜTER IM ERSTEN HALBJAHR 2025, BMW, P.13, 17.



Licensing fluctuated through the year but never stopped. Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who took office on 6 May 2025, announced restrictions on arms exports to Israel on 8 August, but such restrictions applied only to new licenses for goods that “could be used” in Gaza.¹⁰² The government did not specify which goods fell within the restrictions.

Despite the new restrictions, the government granted licenses worth €2,458,745 for export to Israel between 9 August and 22 September 2025.¹⁰³ Across the whole period of the restrictions (9 August to 23 November 2025), German authorities issued individual licenses worth €10,442,392.¹⁰⁴ The licensed goods fell under the following categories:

- A0004 (Bombs, missiles and explosives),
- A0005 (Fire-control and surveillance systems),
- A0006 (Military land vehicles and components)
- A0009 (Warships and naval equipment),
- A0011 (Electronic systems and spacecraft),
- A0013 (Protective Equipment),
- A0015 (Military imaging and sensor equipment),
- A0017 (Other Military Equipment),
- A0021 (Military Software), and
- A0022 (Military Technology).¹⁰⁵

Therefore, even tank parts—such as transmissions and parts thereof which power the Merkava and Namer tanks central to Israel’s ground operation in Gaza¹⁰⁶—appear to have been licensed during the only period in which official restrictions applied in Germany.

After the so-called ceasefire began on 10 October 2025, and five days after a Berlin administrative court dismissed litigation against German arms exports,¹⁰⁷ the German government announced that it would resume unrestricted licensing as of 24 November.¹⁰⁸ In the 18 days that followed, Germany licensed 65 arms exports to Israel worth €53,942,003.¹⁰⁹ While available data overlaps, a government response regarding exports licenses authorized in the period of 1 November to 31 December 2025 amounts to €103,804,460, and included goods classified as A003 (Ammunition and fuse-setting devices), A0004 (Bombs, missiles and explosives), and A0006 (Military land vehicles and components).¹¹⁰ Licenses in 2025 amounted to €201,557,363 and were issued for goods from all but five of the 22 AL-Numbers.¹¹¹ In 2025, German authorities licensed approximately €111.461.222 in tank or armored vehicle parts (A0006), approximately €37.691.227 for warships and naval equipment (A0009), and €18.140.163 in the category Bombs, missiles and explosives (A0004).¹¹²

In 2025, Germany authorized arms licenses valued at €947,811 in general export licenses („Allgemeine Genehmigungen,” AGG) for the export to Israel, a simplified licensing

regime “[t]o expedite and optimize, on a risk-based basis, the licensing procedures for arms exports—particularly to EU countries and certain NATO countries”.¹¹³

Between 7 October 2023 and 23 December 2025, the German government authorized arms exports to Israel for a total of €606,034,511, including war weapons for €20.142.449.¹¹⁴

EXPORT LICENSING IN 2026

While detailed data by month is unavailable for 2026, answers by the government show that the government authorized exports worth €63,589,742 in the first quarter of 2026.¹¹⁵ Licenses encompassed undisclosed quantities of goods under AL-Number A0002 (Large caliber weapons and launchers), A0004 (Bombs, missiles and explosives), A0006 (Military land vehicles and components), and A0010 (Military aircraft and components), among others.¹¹⁶

¹⁰² Bundesregierung, *Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz erklärt zur Entwicklung in Gaza* (8 August 2025).

¹⁰³ Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/1958, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴ Bundestag, BT-Drs 21/5249, p. 71.

¹⁰⁵ Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs 21/5249, p. 71.

¹⁰⁶ Investigate.AFSC, RENK GROUP AG.

¹⁰⁷ See further below, Section VII.

¹⁰⁸ tagesschau, *Deutschland liefert wieder alle Rüstungsgüter an Israel* (17 November 2025).

¹⁰⁹ Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/3373, p. 36; BT-Drs. 21/3774, p. 4.

¹¹⁰ Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/5906, p. 2.

¹¹¹ No licenses were issued for AL0001, AL0002, AL0012, AL0014, and AL0020, see Bundestag, Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahre 2025 (Rüstungsexportbericht 2025), BT-Drs. 21/7590, pp. 86, 105.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 86. These are calculations based on the percentage-values provided by the German government.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 8, 86 (Translation by the author). The approved amount included goods of the categories A0006 (tank parts), A0007 (Chemical, biological and radioactive agents), A0018 (Military production and testing equipment) and A0022 (Military Technology).

¹¹⁴ Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/3774, p. 4.

¹¹⁵ Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/5906, p. 2.

¹¹⁶ Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/5906, p. 2.

After the German Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint aimed at challenging arms exports in February 2026, Germany's already increased arms exports licensing multiplied. **Between 1 April and 31 May 2026, the German government licensed arms worth €730,826,338¹¹⁷—almost four times the total value authorized during the entirety of 2025.** In the second quarter of 2026, arms exports licenses amounted to €735,763,266.¹¹⁸ The government noted that about 67 percent of the approved amount is attributable to a major maritime project.¹¹⁹ Germany has previously authorized comparable projects, such as two submarines of the class Dolphin AIP in 2014 and 2015 as well as four MEKO-type (Sa'ar 6) missile corvettes manufactured by ThyssenKrupp in 2020.¹²⁰ According to Aljazeera reports, the current license most likely pertains to another submarine by ThyssenKrupp.¹²¹ In August 2026, media reported that Israel received the “*biggest submarine built in Germany since the Second World War*,” ThyssenKrupp's over 70m-long IMS Drakon submarine.¹²² The vessel, which can be equipped with a vertical launching system (VLS), enabling it to launch nuclear-tipped cruise missiles or ballistic missiles, is estimated at a market value of about €480 million.¹²³ Three further Dakar-class submarines are expected to reach Israel starting in 2031, **with about 20 percent of the deal reportedly financed by the German government.**¹²⁴

This still leaves approximately €154.51 million (21 percent) for a German Israeli cooperation “in the interest of the *Bundeswehr*”, as well as approximately €88.29 million for other military equipment, an increase from the previous quarter.¹²⁵

In the first six months of 2026, licenses for arms exports to Israel amounted to €799,340,076.¹²⁶ This value, albeit only representing the first half of 2026, **exceeds the licensing values for arms export to Israel from every year in the past 25 years.**¹²⁷ It is also the first time in over 26 months that German authorities licensed the export of **war weapons** to Israel. Between 1 April and 31 June 2026, Germany licensed **€508,750,000 worth in war weapons**. While about €492,961,388 are likely attributable to a submarine license (KWL-No. 18), other war weapons—**likely worth about €15,788,612 million**¹²⁸—belong to the categories KWL-No. 54 and 55: **projectiles and propellant charges for artillery and anti-tank weapons** (such as Dynamit Nobel Defence's Matador), as well as KWL-No. 57, which encompasses **fuses for artillery shells**.¹²⁹ While the government's answer does not provide further contextual information, these goods may be part of the German Israeli cooperation project.

IMPORTS INTO ISRAEL: 2023 TO 2026

According to an Al Jazeera investigation, **German companies exported 100 consignments of arms to Israel worth approximately 43.5 million shekels (approx. €10.64 Mio.) between October 2023 and October 2025.**¹³⁰ This includes further 150 MTU 8V-199 (750hp) diesel engines for Merkava and Namer Tanks in 2024 and 2025, according to the research institute SIPRI.¹³¹

Imports of arms and military vehicle parts from Germany continued throughout 2024, as outlined by a Shadow World Investigations' briefing.¹³² This includes approximately €3.7 million of armored fighting vehicle components, as well as goods in the category “arms and ammunition” for approximately €4.3 million.¹³³

[→ FIG. 7 | P. 21]

117 Disclaimer: This figure is based on a calculation from BT-Drs. 21/6244, p. 24 and BT-Drs. 21/5906, p. 2.

118 Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/7457, p. 2.

119 Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/7457, p. 2; ebs. BT-Drs. 21/6244, p. 24 (referring only to 60% of the corresponding amount).

120 See in more detail Forensis, *German Arms Exports to Israel 2003–2023* (April 2024), pp. 16, 28.

121 Aljazeera, *German arms export licences for Israel surge with focus on sub project*, (27 July 2026).

122 Globes, *Germany delivers Israel's biggest-ever submarine* (5 August 2026).

123 Aljazeera, *German arms export licences for Israel surge with focus on sub project*, (27 July 2026).

124 See in more detail Forensis, *German Arms Exports to Israel 2003–2023* (April 2024), pp. 16, 28.

125 Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/7457, p. 2.

126 Bundesregierung, *Rüstungsexportpolitik im ersten Halbjahr 2026*.

127 Forensis, *German Arms Exports to Israel 2003–2023* (April 2024), p. 27; ebs. EU External Action, *Online database on arms exports*; Bundestag, *Rüstungsexportbericht 2002*, p. 110; Bundestag, *Rüstungsexportbericht 2001*, p. 31. Over this period, the year with the highest value of approved arms exports licenses was 2014, which amounted to €684,563,088, see Forensis, p. 27.

128 Disclaimer: This figure is based on a calculation from BT-Drs. 21/7457, pp. 2–3.

129 Deutscher Bundestag, BT-Drs. 21/7457, pp. 2–3.


130 Al Jazeera, *Not just the US: How 51 countries armed Israel during Gaza war* (22 May 2026).

131 SIPRI, *Arms Transfers Database, Transfer Register*.

132 Shadow World Investigations, *Germany supplied fighting vehicle parts and other arms to Israel throughout 2024*.

133 Ibid., pp. 1–5.

FIGURE 7.
ISRAELI IMPORTS OF GOODS
WITH THE HS-CODE “93” FROM GERMANY, 2025



This trend continued into 2025. According to Israeli customs data, 35 consignments of goods classified under HS-Code 93 (arms and ammunition) were imported into Israel from Germany in every month of 2025 except July (*for individual consignments see Annex A, Table A1*).

57.6 percent of such Israeli imports of 2025 were completed in September alone. The total of imported goods of HS-Code 93 declared to customs in 2025 amounted to 5,279,335 NIS (approx. €1,356,789). This data does not include imports to military ports and airbases.

German statistical data accounts for 3.3 tons of *de facto* exports of goods under HS-Code 93 from Germany into Israel in 2025. The declared goods have a border value of €577,000, an increase from the previous years.¹³⁴ A comparison of German and Israeli data demonstrates the lack of transparency. Israel additionally received 26 consignments of tank parts (HS-Code 87100000) in 2025, importing goods in every month except January. The consignments are valued at 10,623,584.47 NIS (approximately €2,730,261). The largest month was August 2025, at 15.8 percent of the annual total—the same month in which Germany announced its restrictions.

[→ FIG. 8 | P. 23]

Israel continued to import goods under HS-Code 93 in January to May 2026 (*for individual consignments, see Annex A, Table A2*).¹³⁵ Goods imported under this category amounted to 598,434 NIS, or approximately €169,955. Of this sum, 87.3 percent of goods were imported in May 2026.

[→ FIG. 9 | P. 23]

Israeli customs data cannot be matched license-by-license to German authorizations. It does, however, show that physical flows of tank and armored-vehicle parts from Germany continued: by June 2026, declared imports had already reached 96.2 percent of the full-year 2025 value. In the period from January to June 2026, these imports totaled 10,219,412.79 NIS (approximately €2,902,313). A single consignment in June 2026 accounted for 42.4 percent of the value of goods arriving in Israel in the first half of that year.

V. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AS POLICY

The lack of transparency of government decisions on arms exports licenses is flagrant and systematic. Nor is this new: fifteen years ago, German parliamentarians took the government to court because its responses to parliamentary questions on arms licenses were so minimal that they left no room for meaningful oversight. In that case, the government had refused to answer questions about arms exports to Saudi Arabia and Algeria, despite parliamentarians' constitutional right to submit questions to the federal government and request information from it.¹³⁶

In the 2014 judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court held that the government was obliged to “*inform [... on] whether the Federal Security Council had approved the delivery of 200 Leopard tanks to Saudi Arabia.*”¹³⁷ The Court also determined that “[w]ithout access to the government’s information, Parliament cannot exercise its right to oversee the government. Therefore, Parliament’s interest in obtaining information is of particular importance when it comes to uncovering possible legal violations and similar irregularities within the government and the administration.”¹³⁸

While the constitutional right to ask questions and request information is not comprehensive (for example, it does not include a right to be informed of ongoing deliberations of the government, as this would infringe on the separation of powers),¹³⁹ and confidential information endangering “public interests,”¹⁴⁰ as well as the constitutional rights of third parties, namely arms companies,¹⁴¹ may justify limits on what is disclosed, the constitutional right cannot be restricted in a way that eliminates parliamentary oversight altogether.¹⁴²

¹³⁴ Statistisches Bundesamt, Genesis-Online, [Exports and imports: Germany](#) [Search terms: “Israel” and for Commodity Classes]. Figures are provisional and may change. The export value for 2024 was €543,000, for 2023, it was €233,000.

¹³⁵ More recent data is not publicly available at time of publication.

¹³⁶ Art. 38(1), second sentence, and Art. 20(2), second sentence of the Basic Law.

¹³⁷ BVerfG, *Judgment of 21 October 2014, 2 BvE 5/11*, para. 214 (translation by the author).

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 131 (translation by the author).

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 137 f., para. 142.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 151.

FIGURE 8.
**DECLARED VALUE OF ISRAELI ARMORED
VEHICLE-RELATED IMPORTS FROM GERMANY, 2025
(HS-CODE 87.10)**





FIGURE 9.
**DECLARED VALUE OF ISRAELI IMPORTS
FROM GERMANY (HS-CODE 93)
FROM JAN.—MAY 2026**



- Bombs, ammunition & parts
- Weapon parts & accessories
- Bladed side arms
- Revolvers & pistols

The Constitutional Court ruled that the government must, as a rule, provide information that it granted an authorization

1. for a specific arms export transaction and, in this context, provide information,
2. on the type and number of weapons,
3. on the recipient country,
4. on the German companies involved, and
5. on the total volume of the transaction.¹⁴³

Providing only generalized information is expressly insufficient. A summary description of various licensed goods over an extended period—as in the government’s official arms export reports—does not, according to the Court, allow for adequate differentiation.¹⁴⁴ According to the decision, “[t]he 22 export list entries are described in more detail in the Export List (AWV Annex AL). They are characterized by a largely very general classification status. (...) Thus, Leopard tank referred to in the inquiries at issue, as a land vehicle designed for military purposes, would fall under category A0006 of the Export List. However, according to Note 1 in that section, this category also includes armored vehicles, amphibious and fording vehicles, recovery vehicles, and vehicles for transporting and towing ammunition or weapon systems and associated loading systems. Since the arms export reports are based on these broad categories of the Export List, it is virtually impossible to identify, on the basis of these reports, the politically significant export licenses that are relevant for effective parliamentary oversight.”¹⁴⁵

Analysis of recent answers to parliament demonstrates that the German government does not comply with these constitutional obligations. Despite the Court’s findings, its answers on arms exports have become steadily broader and more imprecise.

The contrast between the government’s answers after the 2014 decision and its answers today is stark.

[→ FIG. 11 | P.25]

Asked which final authorizations it had issued during Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s second term, the government replied on 4 March 2015 with a spreadsheet listing the month of the decision, the destination country, the number and type of arms, the exporting company and, in some cases, the value of the arms.

[→ FIG. 10 | P.25]

Answers in the current and previous parliamentary terms are, by contrast, typically vague. For example, several Die LINKE parliamentarians requested information on arms exports licensed between 22 September and 23 November 2015, expressly asking for a spreadsheet setting out the description of each licensed item, its quantity, the date of the licensing decision, the validity period of the license and the company concerned. The government replied with only the total number of licenses granted and the relevant export list numbers (AL-Numbers)—precisely the level of generality the Constitutional Court held insufficient in 2014.

[→ FIG. 11 | P.25]

¹⁴¹ Articles 12(1), 14 of the Basic Law, which covers trade and business secrets; see *ibid.*, para. 182.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, paras. 140 f.

¹⁴³ BVerfG, 2 BvE 5/11, para. 185, 192.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 205.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 205 (transl. by the author).

FIGURE 10.

PARTIAL SCREENSHOT OF THE ANSWER OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT FROM 04. MARCH 2015.

Monat / Jahr der Entscheidung	Endempfängerland	Rüstungsgut	Gesamt-volumen in Euro	exportierendes Unternehmen
12/2002	Ägypten	563 St. Maschinenpistolen, 10 St. Teile für Maschinenpistolen, 5 St. Gewehre mit KWL-Nummer, 200 St. Pistolen	*	Heckler & Koch GmbH
12/2002	Argentinien	Pistolen	505.250	Heckler & Koch GmbH
12/2002	Chile	10.000 St. Teile für Mörsermunition	*	JUNGHANS Feinwerktechnik GmbH
12/2002	Hongkong	13 St. Teile für Maschinenpistolen, 9 St. Gewehre mit KWL-Nummer	*	Heckler & Koch GmbH
12/2002	Indien	Ausrüstung für Bestandteile von Hubschraubern	5 Mio.	ZF Luftfahrttechnik GmbH

FIGURE 11A.

ANSWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM 22 JANUARY 2026, P. 2-3, BT-DRS. 21/3774

1. Wie viele Einzelausfuhrgenehmigungen für Kriegswaffen nach dem Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz mit dem Endziel Israel hat die Bundesregierung seit ihrer Antwort zu den Fragen 8 und 9 der Kleinen Anfrage auf Bundestagsdrucksache 21/1958 (Stichtag: 22. September 2025) bis einschließlich 23. November 2025 erteilt (bitte tabellarisch für jede Genehmigung einzeln angeben: Kriegswaffenlisten-Nummer [KWL-Nummer], Güterbeschreibung, Stückzahl, Datum der Genehmigungserteilung, Laufzeit der Genehmigung sowie begünstigtes Unternehmen; sofern eine endgültige Auswertung für den Zeitraum noch nicht erfolgt ist, bitte die vorläufigen Zahlen angeben)?

2. Wie viele Einzelausfuhrgenehmigungen für sonstige Rüstungsgüter nach dem Außenwirtschaftsgesetz mit dem Endziel Israel hat die Bundesregierung seit ihrer Antwort zu den Fragen 8 und 9 der Kleinen Anfrage auf Bundestagsdrucksache 21/1958 (Stichtag: 22. September 2025) bis zum 23. November 2025 erteilt (bitte tabellarisch für jede Genehmigung einzeln angeben: Ausfuhrlisten-Position [AL-Position], Güterbeschreibung, Stückzahl, Datum der Genehmigungserteilung, Laufzeit der Genehmigung sowie begünstigtes Unternehmen sowie Angabe, ob es sich um eine Länderabgabe handelt; sofern eine endgültige Auswertung für den Zeitraum noch nicht erfolgt ist, bitte die vorläufigen Zahlen angeben)?

Die Fragen 1 und 2 werden gemeinsam beantwortet.

Im erfragten Zeitraum (22. September bis 23. November 2025) wurden keine Einzelausfuhrgenehmigungen für die endgültige Ausfuhr von Kriegswaffen und 26 Einzelausfuhrgenehmigungen für die endgültige Ausfuhr von sonstigen Rüstungsgütern nach Israel erteilt. Die entsprechenden Genehmigungen betreffen die AL-Positionen A0004, A0005, A0006, A0009, A0011, A0013, A0015, A0017, A0022. Da AL-Positionen unterschiedliche Güter und Güterteile enthalten, ist eine Angabe von Stückzahlen für eine AL-Position nicht angezeigt. Eine Abgabe von Bundeswehrmaterial nach Israel ist im fragegegenständlichen Zeitraum nicht erfolgt. Im Übrigen verweist die Bundesregierung auf ihre Vorbemerkung.

3. Wie viele Einzelausfuhrgenehmigungen für Kriegswaffen nach dem Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz mit dem Endziel Israel hat die Bundesregierung in den Monaten April, Mai, Juni und Juli 2025 erteilt (bitte monats-scharf aufschlüsseln und für jede Genehmigung tabellarisch einzeln angeben: KWL-Nummer, Güterbeschreibung, Stückzahl, Datum der Genehmigungserteilung, Laufzeit der Genehmigung sowie begünstigtes Unternehmen; sofern eine endgültige Auswertung für den Zeitraum noch nicht erfolgt ist, bitte die vorläufigen Zahlen angeben)?

4. Wie viele Einzelausfuhrgenehmigungen für sonstige Rüstungsgüter, im speziellen Dual-Use-Güter, wurden nach dem Außenwirtschaftsgesetz mit dem Endziel Israel durch die Bundesregierung in den Monaten April, Mai, Juni und Juli 2025 erteilt (bitte für jede Genehmigung einzeln angeben: AL-Position, Güterbeschreibung, Stückzahl, Datum der Genehmigungserteilung, Laufzeit der Genehmigung sowie begünstigtes Unternehmen sowie Angabe, ob es sich um eine Länderabgabe handelt; sofern eine endgültige Auswertung für den Zeitraum noch nicht erfolgt ist, bitte die vorläufigen Zahlen angeben)?

Die Fragen 3 und 4 werden gemeinsam beantwortet.

Im erfragten Zeitraum (1. April bis 30. Juli 2025) wurden keine Einzelausfuhrgenehmigungen für die endgültige Ausfuhr von Kriegswaffen und 37 Einzelausfuhrgenehmigungen für die endgültige Ausfuhr von sonstigen Rüstungsgütern nach Israel erteilt. Die entsprechenden Genehmigungen betreffen die AL-Positionen A0004, A0005, A0006, A0008, A0009, A0011, A0015, A0018, A0021, A0022. Da AL-Positionen unterschiedliche Güter und Güterteile enthalten, ist eine Angabe von Stückzahlen für eine AL-Position nicht angezeigt. Eine Abgabe von Bundeswehrmaterial nach Israel ist im fragegegenständlichen Zeitraum nicht erfolgt. Im Übrigen verweist die Bundesregierung auf ihre Vorbemerkung.

FIGURE 11B.**ANSWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM
22 JANUARY 2026, P.2-3**

1. Transl.: “1. How many individual export licenses for war weapons under the War Weapons Control Act, with Israel as the final destination, has the Federal Government issued since its response to Questions 8 and 9 of the parliamentary inquiry regarding Bundestag Document 21/1958 (as of September 22, 2025) through November 23, 2025, inclusive? (Please list each license individually in a table: War Weapons List number [KWL number], description of goods, quantity, date the license was granted, duration of the license, and the beneficiary company; if a final assessment for the period has not yet been completed, please provide the preliminary figures?)”
2. How many individual export licenses for other defense equipment under the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, with Israel as the final destination, has the Federal Government issued since its response to Questions 8 and 9 of the parliamentary inquiry regarding Bundestag Document 21/1958 (as of 22 September 2025) through November 23, 2025 (Please list each license individually in a table: Export List item [AL item], description of goods, quantity, date the license was granted, duration of the license, and the beneficiary company, as well as whether it is a state-level license; if a final assessment for the period has not yet been completed, please provide preliminary figures)?
3. How many individual export licenses for war weapons, as defined by the War Weapons Control Act, with Israel as the final destination, did the Federal Government issue in April, May, June, and July 2025? (please break down the figures by month and list each license individually in a table, including: KWL number, description of goods, quantity, date the license was issued, duration of the license, and the beneficiary company; if a final assessment for the period has not yet been completed, please provide the preliminary figures)?
4. How many individual export licenses for other defense-related goods, specifically dual-use goods, were issued by the Federal Government under the Foreign Trade and Payments Act with Israel as the final destination during the months of April, May, June, and July 2025 (please specify for each license individually: AL item number, description of goods, quantity, date the license was issued, duration of the license, and the recipient company, as well as whether it was a country-specific license; if a final assessment for the period has not yet been completed, please provide the preliminary figures)?

Questions 1 and 2 are answered together. During the period in question (September 22 through November 23, 2025), no individual export licenses were issued for the permanent export of war weapons, and 26 individual export licenses were issued for the permanent export of other military equipment to Israel. The relevant licenses pertain to AL items A0004, A0005, A0006, A0009, A0011, A0013, A0015, A0017, and A0022. Since AL items contain different goods and components, it is not appropriate to specify quantities for an individual AL item. No Bundeswehr materiel was transferred to Israel during the period in question. In all other respects, the Federal Government refers to its preliminary remarks.

Questions 3 and 4 are answered together. During the period in question (April 1 through July 30, 2025), no individual export licenses were issued for the final export of war weapons, and 37 individual export licenses were issued for the final export of other military equipment to Israel. The relevant licenses pertain to AL items A0004, A0005, A0006, A0008, A0009, A0011, A0015, A0018, A0021, and A0022. Since AL items contain different goods and components, it is not appropriate to specify quantities for an individual AL item. No Bundeswehr material was transferred to Israel during the period in question. Otherwise, the Federal Government refers to its preliminary remarks.”

Such answers do not allow for parliamentary oversight. The grouping of independent questions into a single answer, a praxis that has increased in recent months, creates additional opacity, as it does not allow for data to be disaggregated.

VII. CHALLENGING GERMAN ARMS EXPORTS IN COURT

For Palestinians in Gaza, the question of German arms licensing is not abstract. On 12 April 2024, five Palestinian claimants sought judicial protection against licenses for the export of war weapons to Israel. The lawsuit challenged export licenses for 10,000 rounds of precision ammunition and 3,000 “Matador” portable anti-tank weapons produced by the German company Dynamit Nobel Defence.¹⁴⁶ The company is a subsidiary of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, an Israeli state-owned arms manufacturer.¹⁴⁷

Journalists have reported about the use of Matador-grenade launchers in Gaza, which appear to be documented in social media posts by Israeli soldiers.¹⁴⁸ Anti-tank weapons like the Matador, which takes its name from the Spanish *matar*, “to kill,” are classified as “war weapons” under German law. In Gaza, such weapons would typically be used in urban warfare, as Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza are not equipped with tanks. In a separate opinion in the ICJ proceedings brought by Nicaragua against Germany,¹⁴⁹ ad-hoc judge Al-Khasawneh described that “[a]nyone familiar with the[] use [of anti-tank weapons] in civil wars would know or ought to know that, especially when employed against an enemy which does not have tanks, as is the case in Gaza, they are used to target homes and other buildings with the devastating effect of penetrating the building and indiscriminately incinerating everyone inside. That they have actually been used in an indiscriminate manner in Gaza is attested to by substantial evidence, including footage indicating the wanton use by Israeli soldiers of anti-tank weapons of the sort supplied by Germany against Palestinian homes in Gaza.”¹⁵⁰

As the 3,000 anti-tank weapons were exported to Israel only a month after the licenses were issued, legal action came too late. The case illustrates a structural accountability gap: by the time affected persons learn of an export license and can reach a court, the authorized weapons may already have been delivered. The lawsuit continued as a declaratory action lawsuit (*Fortsetzungsfeststellungsklage*), which was dismissed on procedural grounds by the Administrative Court of Berlin following an oral hearing on 12 November 2025. The court held that the claimants lacked a legitimate interest in a declaratory judgment,¹⁵¹ particularly due to the (in fact limited) licensing restrictions imposed by Germany at the time. Yet, the German government announced the resumption of unrestricted licensing of arms to Israel only five days after the decision. The claimants were supported by ECCHR as well as the Palestinian human rights organizations Al Haq, Al Mezan and PCHR.¹⁵² An Israeli drone strike killed one of the claimants, Nayef R., in July 2025.

A separate application for interim relief supported by ECCHR targeted licenses for transmissions for Israeli tanks, namely the Merkava IV and V main battle tanks and Namer armored personnel carriers. The transmissions and parts thereof are produced by the Bavarian company RENK.¹⁵³ Initiated in July 2024 before the Administrative Court Frankfurt am Main, the case was dismissed by the Court, as well as by the Hessian Higher Administrative Court on appeal.¹⁵⁴ The claimant, a Palestinian from Gaza, filed a constitutional complaint against these decisions.¹⁵⁵ He argued that the dismissals, which were rejected on admissibility grounds for “lack of third-party standing,” violated his right to effective remedy and to life and bodily integrity under the German Basic Law.¹⁵⁶ The Constitutional Court’s dismissal of February 2026 left him—as well as other Palestinians in Gaza likewise endangered by Israeli forces equipped with German arms—once more without judicial review of decisions by the German government that ultimately endanger his life.

Yet, Germany’s arms-export policy continues to face scrutiny at the international level. In the Nicaragua v. Germany case, the ICJ will be hearing oral arguments on admissibility from 7 to 10 September 2026. If admissible, the Court will ultimately determine whether Germany’s extensive arms exports to Israel violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention and international humanitarian law.

In its first hearings in April 2024, Germany placed substantial emphasis on the **alleged decline** in authorizations

¹⁴⁶ ECCHR, ECCHR und palästinensische Menschenrechtsorganisationen klagen gegen deutsche Waffenexporte nach Israel (April 2024).

¹⁴⁷ Vgl. Investigate, AFSC, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems,

¹⁴⁸ See, e.g., Middle East Monitor, *post*, Instagram; Hanno Hauenstein, *post* X (25 May 2024).

¹⁴⁹ ICJ, Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany).

¹⁵⁰ ICJ, Nicaragua v. Germany, Order of 30 April 2024, separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Al-Khasawneh, para. 6.

¹⁵¹ “Fortsetzungsfeststellungsinteresse”.

¹⁵² ECCHR, Resumption of German arms exports just days after Berlin Administrative Court dismisses case brought by Palestinians for alleged lack of risk of recurrence (November 2025).

¹⁵³ Investigate, AFSC, RENK GROUP AG; see als ND, Gaza-Krieg spült Geld in deutsche Kassen (13 November 2023).

¹⁵⁴ ECCHR, Rechtsschutz gegen Waffenexporte erneut verwehrt.

¹⁵⁵ ECCHR, Verfassungsbeschwerde gegen deutsche Waffenexporte nach Israel.

¹⁵⁶ Art. 19(4) and Art. 2(2)(1) Basic Law.

after November 2023 and on the **limited number of licenses for weapons of war**. The ICJ expressly referred to these arguments in its Order of 30 April 2024 when concluding that these circumstances did not, “at present”, require provisional measures.¹⁵⁷ The Court did not find that German arms exports were lawful, nor did it relieve Germany of its continuing obligations. On the contrary, it recalled that all States supplying arms to parties to an armed conflict must comply with their international obligations “*in order to avoid the risk that such arms might be used to violate*” the Genocide Convention or the Geneva Conventions.¹⁵⁸ The Court’s decision was therefore necessarily conditional upon the factual and legal premises invoked by Germany: that exports had substantially decreased, that every authorization was subject to a meaningful risk assessment, and that Germany would refuse exports wherever the applicable risk thresholds were reached.¹⁵⁹ The Order cannot be detached from those representations and converted into a permanent judicial endorsement of subsequent exports. As Stefan Talmon has observed, the Court’s express reliance on the circumstances existing “at present” means that its conclusion was fact-dependent and liable to change if Germany resumed exports of arms that could be used to commit or facilitate be used to commit or facilitate violations of the Genocide Convention or the Geneva Conventions.¹⁶⁰

As described above, Germany’s practice since the ICJ order undermines those very premises. If the licensing system described at The Hague were genuinely prospective and responsive to changing circumstances, the accumulation of ICJ orders, documented patterns of serious violations and the continued deterioration of conditions in Gaza would necessarily have resulted in the suspension of export authorizations.

The fact that Germany’s arms export licensing regime has expanded significantly—an “evolution” opposite to Germany’s defense in its first oral hearings¹⁶¹—while it continues to go unchecked will likely play a role in later stages of the ICJ proceedings. Germany cannot rely on the preventive character of its export-control system, or on falling authorizations. **Germany has failed to apply the legal standards on which its own defence before the Court depended.**

[→ FIG. 12 | P.29]

¹⁵⁷ ICJ, *Nicaragua v. Germany*, Order of 30 April 2024, paras. 17–20, paras. 18 and 20.

¹⁵⁸ ICJ, *Nicaragua v. Germany*, Order of 30 April 2024, paras. 23–24.

¹⁵⁹ ICJ, *Nicaragua v. Germany*, Order of 30 April 2024, paras. 16–20; Declaration of Judge Tladi, paras. 5 and 10–11; Separate Opinion of Judge Iwasawa, paras. 11–14.

¹⁶⁰ Stefan Talmon, ‘Why the Provisional Measures Order in *Nicaragua v. Germany* Severely Limits Germany’s Ability to Transfer Arms to Israel’, *Verfassungsblog* (2 May 2024).

¹⁶¹ ICJ, *Nicaragua v. Germany*, *verbatim record CR 2024/19* (9 April 2024), p. 19, para. 21.

FIGURE 12.

WHAT GERMANY KNEW WHEN IT APPROVED ARMS EXPORTS: THE ACCUMULATION OF EVIDENCE SET AGAINST GERMANY'S CONTINUED LICENSING, 2023–2026

WHAT GERMANY KNEW Findings, warnings and legal developments	DATE	WHAT GERMANY AUTHORISED Licences granted and positions taken	
ISRAEL BESIEGES GAZA AND KILLS CIVILIANS AT SCALE Israel besieges Gaza, orders 1m residents to “evacuate” and uses white phosphorus in Gaza & Lebanon. Amnesty & HRW document war crimes, incl. a strike killing 106 civilians (incl. 54 children); UN experts warn of genocide.	Oct–Dec	Licensing surges after 7 October €245.6 M licensed in the last twelve weeks of 2023, including 3,000 Matador anti-tank weapons, exported five days after approval.	2023
SOUTH AFRICA TAKES ISRAEL TO THE ICJ Alleges Israeli violations of the Genocide Convention in Gaza.	29 Dec	€19.0 M licensed in December 2023. Germany calls South Africa's allegations “baseless” and announces its intention to submit an intervention at the ICJ on Israel's behalf.	
THE ICJ ORDERS ISRAEL TO PREVENT GENOCIDE The Court finds violations of the Genocide Convention plausible and orders Israel to prevent genocide.	26 Jan	€8,386,289 licensed in January 2024, the month of the first ICJ order.	
23 FEBRUARY UN experts demand all states halt arms transfers to Israel. 28 MARCH the ICJ orders 2nd measures as famine sets in.	23 Feb–28 March	€1,642,619 licensed across February and March 2024.	
NICARAGUA SUES GERMANY OVER ITS ARMS EXPORTS 1 MARCH Nicaragua institutes proceedings against Germany at the ICJ, arguing that German arms exports to Israel violate the Genocide Convention. 30 APRIL ICJ declines to order measures against Germany.	Apr	GERMANY'S POSITION IN ICJ ORAL HEARINGS Germany claims licensing now “significantly more restrictive”, and almost all approvals to be “other military equipment”.	2024
24 MAY ICJ issues its 3rd binding measures, ordering Israel to halt its Rafah offensive; Israel defies them and continues the offensive. 21 NOVEMBER the ICC issues arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant.	24 May–21 Nov	€95.5 M licensed between July and 23 October 2024 alone. Across the full year €163.8 m: tanks and ammunition take half, protective equipment €106,000.	

WHAT GERMANY KNEW Findings, warnings and legal developments	DATE	WHAT GERMANY AUTHORISED Licences granted and positions taken	
AMNESTY AND HRW CONCLUDE: GENOCIDE 14 NOVEMBER Human Rights Watch finds Israel's forced displacement of Palestinians to be a crime against humanity. 5 DECEMBER Amnesty International concludes that Israel is committing genocide. 19 DECEMBER Human Rights Watch documents extermination and acts of genocide.	Oct–Dec	€53.4 M licensed between 18 October and 15 December 2024, the weeks in which the ICC issued warrants against Netanyahu and Galant, and two NGOs published genocide findings.	2024
ISRAEL ATTACKS HOSPITALS AND AMBULANCES 20 MARCH Human Rights Watch documents Israeli assaults on hospitals as war crimes. 21 MARCH Israeli forces attack marked ambulances and rescue vehicles, killing fifteen paramedics.	Jan–Mar	€28.0 M licensed in the first quarter of 2025.	
FAMINE, AND TWO MORE GENOCIDE FINDINGS 12 MAY after an 80-day aid blockade the IPC warns that Gaza's entire population faces acute food insecurity. 27 JULY B'Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights Israel each conclude that Israel is committing genocide. 29 JULY the IPC announces that the worst-case famine scenario is unfolding.	Apr–Jul	€58.8 M licensed in the second quarter of 2025 Tank parts take 59.9% of the first half of 2025.	2025
GERMANY ISSUES LICENSING RESTRICTIONS 8 AUGUST 2025 Germany restricts approvals for equipment that “could be used” in Gaza after Israel announces a new offensive. 12 NOVEMBER 2025 the Berlin administrative court dismisses the Palestinian claimants' case aiming to assess the illegality of German arms exports.	8 Aug–24 Nov	GERMANY CONTINUES TO AUTHORIZE AND DELIVER ARMS DESPITE OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF ARMS RESTRICTIONS €10.4 M 26 LICENCES authorized while restrictions applied, across ten categories incl. tank parts. Unrestricted licensing restarts 24 Nov 2025.	
THE UN FINDS GENOCIDE, CONSTITUTIONAL COURT YIELDS NO MATERIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW 16 SEPTEMBER 2025 the UN Commission of Inquiry finds that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. 3 FEBRUARY 2026 the Federal Constitutional Court dismisses the constitutional complaint on licenses for tank parts.	to 30 Jun	LICENSING ACCELERATES IN 2026 €735.8 M licensed in second quarter of 2026 alone, more than four times the whole of 2025 First licenses of weapons of war since authorized February 2024, worth over €508,7 m Total since October 2023: €1,468,964,329	2026
THE LEGAL CONCLUSION As the evidence of Israel's IHL violations accumulated, the thresholds obliging the German government to refuse arms export licences was reached			
EU COMMON POSITION Criterion 2—clear risk	ARMS TRADE TREATY Art. 7—overriding risk	GERMAN LAW War Weapons Control Act	

VIII. CONCLUSION

Germany has armed Israeli forces throughout its latest assault on Gaza—despite legal thresholds for refusal being met before October 2023, and despite evidence that this threshold has been exceeded having only hardened in the almost three years since. While the intensity of Israel’s attacks on Gaza has decreased in recent months, they remain near-daily, with an attack on Gaza port killing at least six Palestinians, including a child, on 18 August 2026.¹⁶² The illegal attacks of the United States and Israel against Iran, assisted through Germany’s Ramstein airbase,¹⁶³ as well as escalating attacks on Lebanon and the Westbank¹⁶⁴ did not wean an arms export policy that can hardly be described as “restrictive.”¹⁶⁵ As Human Rights Watch aptly stated: Israel imports its abuses from Gaza into the West Bank, with Israel’s tanks rolling into the occupied West Bank for the first time in decades last year, settler attacks escalating, and sweeping measures facilitating land grabs and settlement expansion, transforming the illegal occupation of Palestine into annexation.¹⁶⁶

In its Advisory Opinion of 2024, the ICJ determined that third states such as Germany have a duty not only not to assist Israel’s illegal actions, but to bring its violation of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination to an end.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, Germany’s condemnation¹⁶⁸ stops short at words. It’s support of Israel’s oppression of Palestinians, and its violations of international law, through arms and political support, continues unabated.

With judicial review of individual arms exports licenses now largely closed off, parliamentary and public scrutiny are direly needed remaining checks. Yet, the German government is disclosing less, not more.

IX. ISRAELI CUSTOMS IMPORT RECORDS

The tables below reproduce the individual import declarations published on the Israeli government database data.gov.il¹⁶⁹ which underlies the analysis in section IV.6. Values are declared customs values in new Israeli shekels; the month is given as a numeral.

¹⁶² Aljazeera, *Israeli strike reported to kill at least six in Gaza City* (18 August 2026).

¹⁶³ SWR, *Welche Rolle spielt die Ramstein Air Base im Iran-Krieg?* (19 March 2026).

¹⁶⁴ See, e.g. UN, *Guterres: Fast-tracking West Bank outposts is a ‘flagrant violation’ of international law* (27 July 2026); UN OHCHR, *UN experts condemn escalation in attacks against Palestinians in Gaza and West Bank* (10 August 2026).

¹⁶⁵ This wording is however repeatedly used by the German government, see e.g. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energy, *Rüstungsexportpolitik* (31 January 2024); Bundestag, *Answer of Parliament, BT-Drs. 20/9686*, p. 3 (11 December 2023), in which the German government stated that it „pursues a restrictive and responsible arms export policy [...] Respect for human rights in the recipient country plays a prominent role in the decision-making process.”

¹⁶⁶ HRW, *Israel Imports Gaza Abuses into the West Bank* (26 February 2025).

¹⁶⁷ ICJ, *Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem Advisory Opinion Of 19 July 2024*, paras. 273–279.

¹⁶⁸ See, e.g. Auswärtiges Amt, *Erklärungen des Auswärtigen Amts in der Regierungspressekonferenz vom 19.08.2026*.

¹⁶⁹ Datagov, *Taxes Authority, Customs Import Statistics Data* (currently unavailable).

TABLE A1.

**HS CHAPTER 93 IMPORTS
INTO ISRAEL FROM GERMANY, 2025**

MONTH	CODE	DESCRIPTION	CUSTOMS HOUSE	QUANTITY	NIS AMOUNT
1	93040090	Other arms	Ben Gurion Airport	730,000	214,874.79
1	93069090	Bombs & ammunitions & parts thereof	Eilat	12,000	63,772.56
1	93070000	Bladed side arms	Ben Gurion Airport	2,000	5,156.29
1	93070000	Bladed side arms	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	277.02
2	93070000	Bladed side arms	Ben Gurion Airport	38,000	8,203.10
3	93052000	Of shotguns or rifles of heading 93.03	Ben Gurion Airport	95,000	5,024.59
3	93059900	Parts and accessories of articles of headings 93.01 to 93.04	Ben Gurion Airport	197,000	7,577.33
4	93020000	Revolvers and pistols, other than those of heading 93.03 or 93.04.	Ben Gurion Airport	24,000	74,634.22
4	93040090	Other arms	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	187.12
4	93051000	Of revolvers or pistols	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	1,407.24
5	93040090	Other arms	Ben Gurion Airport	60,000	9,593.73
5	93040090	Other arms	Ben Gurion Airport	2,000	363.28
5	93051000	Of revolvers or pistols	Ben Gurion Airport	43,000	7,986.13
5	93051000	Of revolvers or pistols	Ben Gurion Airport	41,000	7,096.77
5	93051000	Of revolvers or pistols	Center	10,000	5,444.10
5	93070000	Bladed side arms	Ben Gurion Airport	1,862,000	560,519.32
6	93020000	Revolvers and pistols, other than those of heading 93.03 or 93.04.	Ben Gurion Airport	36,000	87,710.92
6	93059100	Of military weapons of heading 93.01	Ben Gurion Airport	120,000	228,783.36
6	93069090	Bombs & ammunitions & parts thereof	Haifa	858,750,000	31,717.75
8	93020000	Revolvers and pistols, other than those of heading 93.03 or 93.04.	Ben Gurion Airport	25,000	57,316.02
8	93040090	Other arms	Ben Gurion Airport	3,000	28,994.09
8	93051000	Of revolvers or pistols	Ben Gurion Airport	2,000	1,341.80
8	93051000	Of revolvers or pistols	Ben Gurion Airport	26,000	3,849.66
8	93070000	Bladed side arms	Center	12,000	7,939.02
9	93040090	Other arms	Ben Gurion Airport	500,000	154,451.08
9	93069090	Bombs & ammunitions and parts thereof	Ben Gurion Airport	14,000,000	2,885,707.76
10	93040090	Other arms	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000,000	308,886.29
10	93070000	Bladed side arms	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	2,003.71
11	93020000	Revolvers and pistols, other than those of heading 93.03 or 93.04.	Ben Gurion Airport	7,000	14,650.17
11	93070000	Bladed side arms	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	14,437.83
12	93020000	Revolvers and pistols, other than those of heading 93.03 or 93.04.	Ben Gurion Airport	3,000	7,254.09
12	93059100	Of military weapons of heading 93.01	Ben Gurion Airport	14,000	176,873.05
12	93069090	Bombs & ammunitions and parts thereof	Ben Gurion Airport	1,150,000,000	29,865.72
12	93069090	Bombs & ammunitions & parts thereof	Ben Gurion Airport	275,000	55,850.84
12	93069090	Bombs & ammunitions & parts thereof	Ben Gurion Airport	200,000	209,583.98

TABLE A2.
HS CHAPTER 93 IMPORTS INTO ISRAEL
FROM GERMANY, JANUARY-MAY 2026

MONTH	CODE	DESCRIPTION	CUSTOMS HOUSE	QUANTITY	NIS AMOUNT
2	93070000	Bladed side arms	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	11,494.42
2	93020000	Revolvers and pistols	Ben Gurion Airport	2,000	4,726.01
2	93051000	Of revolvers or pistols	Ben Gurion Airport	203,000	18,009.26
2	93051000	Of revolvers or pistols	Ben Gurion Airport	25,000	32,634.94
2	93020000	Revolvers and pistols	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	5,339.06
3	93059100	Of military weapons of heading 93.01	Ben Gurion Airport	2,000	599.84
4	93070000	Bladed side arms	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	3,104.79
5	93059100	Of military weapons of heading 93.01	Ben Gurion Airport	3,000	35,900.37
5	93070000	Bladed side arms	Ben Gurion Airport	8,000	2,191.29
5	93070000	Bladed side arms	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	1,736.22
5	93069090	Bombs & ammunitions and parts thereof	Ben Gurion Airport	9,848,000	474,575.96
5	93052000	Revolvers and pistols	Ben Gurion Airport	40,000	4,090.15
5	93051000	Of revolvers or pistols	Ben Gurion Airport	30,000	4,031.72

TABLE A3.
HS CODE 8710 IMPORTS
INTO ISRAEL FROM GERMANY, 2025

MONTH	CODE	CUSTOMS HOUSE	QUANTITY	NIS AMOUNT
2	87100000	Ashdod	6,000	643,685.14
2	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	3,258.27
2	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	2,000	53,208.69
2	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	70,000	27,133.60
3	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	20,000	248,694.24
3	87100000	Ashdod	6,000	694,951.11
4	87100000	Ashdod	6,000	748,170.40
4	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	265,000	132,440.41
4	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	13,292.88
4	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	126,000	78,615.61
5	87100000	Ashdod	6,000	724,891.39
5	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	42,000	523,481.94
6	87100000	Ashdod	12,000	1,421,649.55
6	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	100,000	29,271.17
7	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	172,000	257,980.01
8	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	1,000	22,650.05
8	87100000	Ashdod	12,000	1,389,813.55
8	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	162,000	270,186.91
9	87100000	Ashdod	12,000	18,617.26
9	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	20,000	244,651.94
9	87100000	Ashdod	6,000	691,585.05
10	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	36,000	438,884.40
11	87100000	Ben Gurion Airport	279,000	250,824.29
11	87100000	Ashdod	80,000	116,655.78
12	87100000	Ashdod	168,000	241,811.84
12	87100000	Ashdod	12,000	1,337,178.99

TABLE A4.
HS CODE 8710 IMPORTS
INTO ISRAEL FROM GERMANY, 2026

MONTH	CODE	DESCRIPTION	CUSTOMS HOUSE	QUANTITY	NIS AMOUNT
1	87100000		Ashdod	6,000	660,953.75
2	87100000		Haifa	316,000	671,582.49
2	87100000		Ashdod	60,000	465.26
2	87100000		Ben Gurion Airport	2,000	289.82
2	87100000		Ashdod	6,000	653,087.78
3	87100000		Ben Gurion Airport	101,000	97,654.36
3	87100000		Ashdod	2,000	549.38
3	87100000		Ashdod	6,000	651,781.56
4	87100000		Haifa	16,000	22,188.18
4	87100000		Ben Gurion Airport	1,202,000	180,648.77
4	87100000		Ashdod	18,000	1,959,213.45
4	87100000		Ben Gurion Airport	140,000	114,950.04
5	87100000		Ashdod	6,000	619,026.52
5	87100000		Ben Gurion Airport	1,130,000	103,592.88
5	87100000		Ben Gurion Airport	656,000	146,168.47
6	87100000		Ben Gurion Airport	18,000	4,337,260.08

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AUTHOR:

ALINA PUCKO

CONTRIBUTIONS:

ALEXANDER SCHWARZ

EDITORIAL AND PUBLICATION SUPPORT:

KHALED EL MAHMOUD

RAHEL WELDEMARIAM

COPY EDITOR:

DAVE YOUSSEF

SEPTEMBER 2026